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Book Reviews 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, VOLUME IX: THE JUDICIARY 
AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-1921. By Al-
exander M. Bickel1 and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.2 New York: 
Macmillan. 1984. Pp. xiv, 1041. $75.00. 
Paul L. Murphy 3 
In this volume of the scandalously overdue Holmes Devise Se-
ries, Alexander Bickel and Benno Schmidt have crafted a work fi-
nally benefitting the Series's expectations. Unlike earlier volumes, 
care is taken here to consider not only the inner workings of the 
Court, but also the personal and social factors that went into its 
behavior. The volume conveys a refreshing historical sense of the 
Court's role in the public policy struggles of the time. 
Bickel, who had completed 718 pages at the time of his death 
in November 1974, had indicated that, unlike the authors of earlier 
volumes, he hoped to place the work of the Court in its political, 
social, economic, and intellectual context. He wished to treat great 
cases not as isolated episodes, but as part of a process, thus empha-
sizing the background and the consequences as well as the decision. 
Parts of that purpose were carried out very well. He found the 
Court confronted in this period with the legislative fruits of the Pro-
gressive movement, but vacillating, frequently divided, and as yet 
(apart from Holmes) not fully equipped for the task. If not hospita-
ble, most Justices were at least surprisingly tolerant toward social 
reform. Bickel briefly set the stage for this period, detailing the 
spirit of nationalism abroad, and the new importance of the contro-
versy over the fourteenth amendment. He then moved his charac-
ters onstage with careful assessments of their personalities, their 
political orientation, their legal training, and their constitutional 
I. Late Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History and William Clyde 
DeVane Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
2. President, Yale University. 
3. Professor of History, University of Minnesota. 
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philosophies. He showed how such men dealt with a broad range of 
legal issues, from antitrust cases, tort litigation, contract clause is-
sues, and Indian law, to the new police power regulations of every-
thing from drugs and liquor to minimum wages, maximum hours, 
and child labor. His discussion is particularly useful in the way it 
relates judicial opinions to progressivism, examining both the social 
forces that affected its creation, and the impact judicial rules had 
upon public policy. Because Bickel's work is now ten years old, 
however, the sources are obviously dated. In contrast, Schmidt's 
segment is based heavily on works published since Bickel's death. 
Benno Schmidt, in preparing the work's three concluding 
chapters, chose not to update Bickel but confined himself almost 
solely to exploring the White Court's civil rights record. He fo-
cused heavily upon peonage cases, state restrictive legislation such 
as the Jim Crow laws, and state disenfranchisement, with special 
emphasis on the grandfather clause. Like Bickel, Schmidt paints on 
a broad canvas. In some respects these chapters are even more re-
vealing and successful than Bickel's. Schmidt is more sophisticated 
in locating the Court in the middle of events sweeping the nation-
progressive reform, massive immigration, explosively intensifying 
racial antagonism, as well as labor struggles and a world war. Thus 
the Court was confronted with urgent issues regarding civil liberties 
and Civil War amendments, as well as the need to construe the bur-
geoning federal social and economic legislation. 
Bickel presents extensive evidence of the Court's activism. 
Before 1915, the Justices either accepted or rewrote progressive leg-
islation, with the intent of upholding federal reform and even en-
couraging state action. In this context, Bickel devotes over a 
hundred pages to the "rule of reason." With regard to the states 
themselves, this progressive trend meant frequent permissive pro-
nouncements in state due process cases. Thus, as Charles Warren 
pointed out in 1913 in an article entitled The Progressiveness of the 
United States Supreme Court, recent instances in which the 
Supreme Court struck down social and economic legislation were 
very few. As Felix Frankfurter pointed out at the same time, "on 
the whole, we have entered upon an epoch in which Justice Holmes 
has been the most consistent and dominating force and to which 
Justices Day and Hughes have been contributing factors." Accord-
ing to Bickel the Justices feared that hidebound constitutional inter-
pretation based upon antiquated social and economic theories 
would breed extreme radicalism in the country. And certainly, as 
Bickel carefully details, the leftwing assault upon the judiciary was 
massive, especially prior to the teens. It included not only blasts at 
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the Supreme Court, but even more strongly at state courts, which 
had become particularly distrusted and feared due to their con-
servative bias. 
Telling here were the broadsides of influential progressive lead-
ers. Albert Beveridge, the subsequent biographer of John Marshall, 
urged that the Constitution be made into a "living thing," growing 
with the people's growth, aiding the people in their struggle for life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Theodore Roosevelt seldom 
lost an opportunity in his later career to blast the Court for "pro-
tecting fossilized wrong." His charge that the Court had created a 
"neutral area between the power of the states and the power of the 
Federal government," convinced many that the Court and the Con-
stitution were instruments of political warfare in conservative 
hands. Bickel sees this attack on the judiciary as liberalizing the 
Court. By the mid-teens the attacks diminished and the Court 
again reasserted its conservatism. Clearly, by the end of the period, 
it was becoming increasingly recalcitrant and a strong nay sayer 
through judicial vetoes. Indeed, in this period Bickel sees far less 
doctrine and far more simple negativism. The trashing of the fed-
eral child labor law, through a disturbingly narrow interpretation of 
the federal commerce power, was a case in point. Thus, as Bickel 
makes clear, the Court's decisions once again represented the atti-
tudes of bar and bench and the expectations of the propertied 
classes. This hardening of the Court into what William Swindler 
has called "an obstructive force of scholastic legalism" character-
ized its behavior through the twenties and especially in the early 
thirties. 
Perceptions of the Court's changing role in this period clearly 
differ. Frankfurter saw the Court during the first third of the twen-
tieth century expanding its authority by becoming the final author-
ity upon the relationships of the individual to the state, the 
individual to the United States, the states to the United States, and 
the states to each other. It thereby, he argued, surrendered much of 
its prior function. Bickel disagrees. Constitutional and statutory 
litigation was clearly on the rise in these years, he contends, but the 
major reform in the Court's jurisdiction, which was to remove the 
bulk of ordinary private litigation, lay in the future. In this early 
period, as shown by Bickel's painstaking review of the Court's 
docket, the Supreme Court had by no means ceased to be a common 
law court. In fact, this was still its principal function. 
Schmidt also sees a modification of the Court's former "aggres-
sive doctrine of laissez faire constitutionalism." In fact, he sees the 
partial continuation of the doctrine, plus the institutional revival 
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and liberalizing pressure on the Court, as important factors in its 
new willingness to consider constitutional rights for blacks. In do-
ing so, he views the Court of these years departing significantly 
from the conventional picture of the progressives' total failure in 
race relations. Rather, he sees these years as the beginning of a new 
civil rights sensitivity. For the first time, he argues, the Court in the 
Grandfather Clause Cases of 1915 applied the fifteenth amendment 
and what was left of the federal civil rights statutes to strike down 
state laws calculated to deny blacks the right to vote. For the first 
time, it used the thirteenth amendment in 1914 to strike down state 
laws that supported peonage by treating breach of labor contracts as 
criminal. For the first time, in 1917 it found in the fourteenth 
amendment limits on laws requiring racial separation. Also for the 
first time, in 1914 it put some teeth in the equality side of the "sepa-
rate but equal doctrine." The decisions taken together, he con-
cludes, mark "the first time in American history that the Court 
opened itself in more than a passive way to the promises of the Civil 
War amendments." It thus breathed life into Reconstruction prin-
ciples that had been left for dead by the Waite and Fuller Courts for 
three decades. He acknowledges that the promises of these deci-
sions were not to be realized until much later. His argument is per-
suasive, and many of the previously obscure cases on which he 
relies will now have to be reexamined in light of his argument. 
The volume then is rich in many ways. One only hopes it sets 
a trend for future volumes and continues the Series on the high road 
of good history as well as good case law. 
